



Directorate of Intelligence 5 May 1992

## China Proliferation Watch April 1992



This is the fifth in a series of monthly reports that summarize Chinese proliferation behavior. In addition to keeping track of Chinese negotiations, contracts, and deliveries of equipment and technologies of proliferation concern, the series will discuss internal Chinese debate on proliferation issues and Beijing's response to US and international pressure to moderate its behavior.

## Summary








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## Chronology of Reporting\*



1 April

Officers of the Chinese National Defense University—a senior officer think tank—criticized US arms control policies during a visit on 27 March, claiming that mey were aimed at protecting Washington's dominant position in the world arms market. The Chinese objected to their treatment under the MTCR, alleging that countries that joined the regime after its establishment were "not on the same footing" as original members. The officers' remarks echo past public statements that China—which was not invited to participate in the formulation of the regime—should not be expected to abide by MTCR guidelines.



Press reports indicate that a Chinese industrial delegation in Israel--which included U Keli, a China Great Wall Industrial Corporation (CGWIC) Vice President--discussed launching Israeli satellites on Chinese rockets and offered to cooperate with Tel Aviv on space and satellite technologies. Israel's indigenous launch vehicle development efforts suggest Tel Aviv is committed to launching Israeli satellites aboard its own vehicles, although the Chinese launch vehicles can carry larger and heavier payloads. The Chinese also may have discussed transferring launch vehicle technology to supplement Israel's program.







China will fulfill its agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency when it exports 30-kilowatt research nuclear reactors to Syria and Ghana, according to Chinese press reports. Beijing last year agreed to deliver the reactors under IAEA auspices.



China rejected a German offer to send an inspection team to assess safety standards at China's recently inaugurated Qinshan nuclear power plant, according to Hong Kong press accounts. The refusal came one day after China and Germany signed a nuclear cooperation and safety agreement which establishes a legal framework for the exchange of nuclear technical information, according to press reports. Beijing may have feared safety measures in place at Qinshan would not measure up to Germany's scrutiny, resulting in bad publicity for China's nuclear program.




15 April

reporting indicates that Philippe Thiebaud,
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nuclear,
Space, and Non-Proliferation Affairs, suggested that
suppliers of nuclear equipment for Chinese reactor projects
exchange information and coordinate their actions to
monitor Chinese orders, and noted the importance of
checking with all potential suppliers. Thiebaud's remarks
were prompted by a Chinese order from France of
equipment for the Pakistani reactor project, which the
French noted was a duplicate of the Qinshan reactor in
China for which France was a component supplier. Paris
refused to approve the export of the components for the
Pakistani reactor because Islamabad does not accept fullscope safeguards on its nuclear program.


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





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the chemical weapons negotiations under the UN Conference on Disarmament indicates that China, along with Pakistan, Algeria, and Iran--its three primary clients for sensitive technology purchases--tried to create an internationalized verification system at sharp variance from mainstream views. In what appears to be an effort to allow accused states to hide evidence of a chemical weapons production activities that violate the challenge inspection regime, the four states argued challenging states provide evidence and full information, including the location of the site of inquiry, to the challenged state as soon as the challenge is made.







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




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


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